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Divorce Reform and the Image of the Child 
CHRISTINE PIPER* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years marriage and divorce have again become the focus of a debate which has 
attracted and digested in varying degrees the contributions of academics, practitioners, 
politicians, religious leaders and the popular press. It has resulted in a series of official 
documents from the Inter-departmental Committee's Report on Conciliation in 1983 through the 
Law Commission Working Papers to the White Paper on Divorce Reform1 and, now, Parts I and 
II of the Family Law Bill 1995. It has been argued that the proposed legislation does not pay 
sufficient attention to the interests of children. James and Lyon note that "although there are now 
in excess of 160,000 children under the age of 16 each year who experience the divorce of their 
parents, the White Paper contains in total little more than two pages referring to the needs of 
children in divorce", supporting their contention that there is an "almost complete absence of 
discussion concerning children" in the White Paper.2  
 
However, the scattered passages which make up those two pages and the similar references in the 
preceding Consultation Paper,3 can be interpreted quite differently if quantity is not the yardstick 
for importance. Instead I will argue that the child of divorcing parents is given  
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a high profile in these documents and that the particular image of the child - the 
conceptualisation or "mental representation of something not present to the senses"4 - which is 
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drawn on and reconstituted in these documents is crucial to the development both of government 
policy in relation to the family and of the operation of family law.  
The following assertions are to be found in the Foreword to the Consultation Paper:  
 ... Almost inevitably the breakdown of a marriage is hard for one or both of the parties 
and especially for the children. I believe that a good divorce law ... should seek to 
eliminate unnecessary distress for the parties and particularly for their children in those 
cases where a marriage has broken down irretrievably. ...  
 It is clear that, when a marriage breaks down and there are children of the marriage, they 
are very vulnerable to consequent damage. [my italics]5
 
This is echoed in Chapter 5 of the White Paper which begins, "Separation and divorce constitute 
a painful process for all the family members concerned but particularly for the children".6 
Prominence is also given to children in the discussion in the White Paper of seven "Criticisms of 
Current Divorce Law". These include three points which, together, convey the idea that the 
decision to divorce is not currently sufficiently `thought through' or child-centred: "The system 
does nothing to save saveable marriages"7 because it allows divorce "after a period of just a few 
months [the parents] having had few chances to stop and consider whether this is the best 
outcome for them and their children",8 "Divorce can be obtained without proper consideration of 
the consequences and implications",9 and "The system makes things worse for the children".10   
 
These basic assumptions that the current divorce process is `bad' for children and that the break-
up of their parents' marriage can itself be a cause of harm to children are, it is true, not discussed 
in any depth, the White Paper referring directly to only one recent piece of research11 that "has 
confirmed that marital conflict is harmful to children".12 However, references to these 
assumptions are effectively placed. For example, the Government's objectives, summarised in 
paragraph 3.5, are five-fold with the first two relating to marriage saving and possibly also the 
third, "to ensure that the parties understand the practical consequences of divorce13 before taking 
any irreversible decision", in that para. 4.33 makes the point that couples who have thought 
through the consequences may "find some way of re-negotiating their relationship so that they 
and their children can have a future together". Such objectives should be read alongside the fact 
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that the preceding Consultation Paper14 had repeated the assertion of the Law Commission 
Report The Ground for Divorce that "The children would usually prefer their parents to stay 
together".15 However, "where divorce is unavoidable" the objectives of the proposals are: "... to 
minimise the bitterness and hostility between the parties and to reduce the trauma for the 
children; and to keep to the minimum the cost to the parties and the taxpayer".16 It is later made 
clear that there is a relationship between the two parts of this fourth objective: 
 
 ... it is conflict between the parents which has been linked to greater social and 
behavioural problems among children rather than the separation and divorce itself. A 
reduction in bitterness and hostility was seen by consultees as a central objective in 
reducing the harm that might be done to children of the marriage.17   
 
 A divorce process based on a requirement to reflect rather than recriminate will help to 
reduce conflict and encourage cooperation, which will in turn minimise the distress 
caused to children.18   
  
 Conflict is harmful to children and the Government is of the view that the reduction of 
conflict should be high on the list of objectives for a good divorce process.19   
 
 
Therefore, the aim of conflict reduction is justified because of the damage to children20 and the 
greater use of mediation is justified because it will reduce conflict.  
 Consultees considered that, in general, the advantages of mediation outweighed its 
disadvantages. Advantages included the reduction of conflict between the couple leading 
to a reduction in trauma for the children.21  
 
 The Government agrees that bitterness and hostility are reduced through the mediation 
process and couples are helped to manage conflict to the benefit of their children and 
themselves.22  
 
Mediation is also encouraged because it teaches parental communication and because it 
promotes parental responsibility23 - both deemed to further the child's welfare. The focus on the 
reduction of hostility for the benefit of the child also supports the proposal for a "first port of 
call" which is essentially an information giving session:  
 The Government is of the view that couples need a better understanding ... of the effects 
of divorce on children before their marriage is dissolved.  ... As discussed earlier, 
reduction and management of conflict is essential if the effects of divorce on children are 
to be minimised. It is equally important, however, for parents to be informed about their 
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continuing parental responsibility, what this means, and how to deal with children who 
are suffering distress as a result of the breakdown in their parents' marriage.24  
    
 
It is, therefore, possible to argue that a quite specific understanding of the child's nature and 
needs is conveyed. This representation of the child as a vulnerable person who does not want her 
parents to divorce, who is damaged by both the process of divorce and its consequences and who 
is powerless to affect the divorce process dominates both the Consultation Paper and the White 
Paper and provides justification for the key proposals in these documents and resulting proposals 
for legislation. In effect, the debate surrounding divorce reform has led to the emergence of a 
`popular' and powerful image of the child as `the victim' of divorce, that is, as a passive 
participant in the divorce process and one needing protection from the consequences of divorce.25  
 
THE CHILD AS VICTIM 
 
This image of the child as a victim, to be protected without qualification by the legal system and 
other institutions regulated by law because he or she holds no responsibility for a damaging 
situation, is not novel. In medieval and early modern England such protection had been confined 
largely to those minors who owned property and who were perceived as the victims of rapacious 
guardians. Whilst, therefore, the court "historically regarded itself as the protector of the minor 
against the manipulation of adults",26 for propertyless children, the majority, the "long tradition 
of the court's right to protect children against adult exploitation"27 required the creation of 
offences and the imposition of duties by legislation, notably the Tudor Poor Laws, nineteenth 
century factory and mines regulations and, since the Prevention of Cruelty to and Protection of 
Children Act 1889, the labelling of cruelty to children as a specific criminal act. In the context of 
legislation over the last 150 years, therefore, the child has been perceived and `processed' 
principally as a victim, to whom attributions of culpability and responsibility are not possible, 
when the child is a victim of assault and abuse and, specifically, a victim of parental failure and 
cruelty or a victim of ill treatment by an employer.28 Within legal communications, therefore, the 
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concept of the child as a victim to be protected operates as a particular `semantic artifact',29 one 
of several "constructs ... produced by the legal discourse itself"30 which avoid the need to deal 
with all the complexities and contradictions which are inherent in a `real' child and which `fit' 
into law's own procedures and functions.31   
 
Yet this analysis is misleading if it suggests an unproblematic link between the existence of 
offences or duties which carry the potential to construct a child as victim and the availability of 
powerful images of children as victim in, say, a political discourse. For example, despite the 
growth of victimology32 and the developing policy emphasis on victims of crime,  
 [T]here is very little mention of children as victims of crime. The victimization of 
children is seen solely in terms of child abuse, physical and sexual. ... The term `child 
abuse` is used to describe acts which may fail to be recorded as crime, and such cases 
may be diverted out of the criminal justice process into civil protection proceedings. As a 
result, interest and concern about child victimization has developed largely outside a 
criminological framework ... .33
 
Therefore, whilst adults are generally accorded the status of victim when disadvantaged by the 
criminal action of another, the 'victim of crime' status is awarded more restrictively to children. 
So often what happens to children is not labelled in such a way that a criminal offence is denoted 
- evident, for example, in the references to `abuse' rather than `assault', regardless of whether 
criminal or civil proceedings are contemplated. The current image of the child as victim of crime 
may be modified by attention, for example, to bullying in schools34 and to secondary 
victimisation in relation to domestic violence,35 but it is still a relatively narrow construction.36 In 
addition, those offences committed against children which are processed as crimes may be dealt 
with in ways which accord less importance to them because the impact of crime is assessed in 
relation to adult criteria. So, for example, Morgan and Zedner discuss bicycle theft which does 
not usually lead to a high level of police response because of the relatively low level of monetary 
value involved and yet, for a child, may mean the theft of their most valuable possession, 
possibly having been `earned' and having facilitated independence.  
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There are two obvious reasons why this has happened: a focus on the `welfare of the child', with 
social work `control' of child abuse, and the lack of any "political impetus" for recognition of the 
needs of child victims more generally.37 The resulting "tendency to marginalise children as 
victims of crime"38 has practical implications: children are denied the benefits of recognition as 
victims of acts that, if committed against adults, would be labelled as criminal. Denunciation of 
the offender does not occur or is not public (for example where abuse leads to care not criminal 
proceedings) and there are no `victim support' services. This marginalisation of children as 
victims of crime has also contributed to the development of a popular image of the child who, 
inter alia, offends, which is almost exclusively an image of the child `as offender'. As a result 
there is no prevalent image of the child as perpetrator and victim of crime despite research which 
shows that the categories of children who offend and children who are victims of crime "are not 
mutually exclusive but are often products of each other".39 For example, "being an offender puts 
individuals in situations which ensure that they are more likely to be victims of crime than the 
rest of the population".40   
 
VICTIMS OF PARENTAL HOSTILITY 
 
The development of a powerful image of the child `as victim' in relation to divorce reform is, 
therefore, of greater significance because in only a limited range of circumstances and situations 
has there been a relevant consensus that a child should be protected through state policy and 
action, notwithstanding conflicting adult interests. In addition, comparatively rarely is public 
policy based on the image of the child as victim. The current intense debate in the UK on 
educational policy, for example, is conducted almost entirely around concepts of parental rights 
and societal needs (for a flexible workforce or `disciplined' youth). Yet  in relation to divorce, 
whilst the Consultation and White Papers reveal a political consensus on the nature and 
universality of the harm, it is far from clear there is societal consensus that divorce is a social 
problem or that it is a problem for the reasons constituted in the political documents. The 
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assumptions which underlie the government's proposals draw on a different consensus - one 
which has emerged in the last two decades among child welfare professionals through their 
acceptance of the likelihood that the child, during and after parental separation, is 
psychologically harmed by inter-parental hostility and lack of contact with one of her parents - 
the latter harm being assumed to follow the former.   
 
Research and professional experience in the social and `psy' sciences suggests a complex picture 
of family life after parental separation. In `The Rights and Wrongs of Children'(1983)41 
Freeman's chapter, entitled `Children as Victims of the Divorce Process', was, amongst other 
things, a consciousness-raising exercise in relation to the needs and welfare of children whose 
parents separate. He referred to what was then recent research by Wallerstein and Kelly, stating 
that "Divorce causes trauma" and "the children of divorce ... are amongst the most vulnerable 
members of society"42 but it was a wide-ranging and detailed review which drew on a range of 
images of the child in relation to divorce rather than the one image evident in recent policy 
documents.   
 
What is interesting is that a particular professional consensus is now endorsed and 
communicated so enthusiastically and unequivocally in policy documents and judicial comment. 
It was the much more general concern of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, 
reporting in 1956, about the effects on children of the disruption of family life and a lack of 
confidence that parents could safely be left to make arrangements when emotionally affected by 
their divorce43 that led to the requirement that the court should oversee arrangements for all 
children of divorcing parents (now section 41 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973). The 
Robinson Report in the early 1980s also noted in broad terms: "It is accepted on all sides that the 
consequences of marriage breakdown and divorce are at best unpleasant for the spouses and the 
children and at worst productive of serious and prolonged anguish and of injury to children".44 
The more recent Consultation Paper in its Foreword was more specific, "Such damage [to 
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children of the marriage] is particularly likely where the marriage has ended in bitterness and 
where the children do not have a continuing reasonable relationship thereafter with both 
parents".45 The White Paper makes the point even clearer:  
 it is conflict between the parents which has been linked to greater social and behavioral 
problems among children ... A reduction in bitterness and hostility was seen by 
consultees as a central objective in reducing the harm that might be done to children of 
the marriage.46  
 
The influence of an increasingly narrow version of that perceived professional consensus is also 
evident in the rhetorical question of Judge Pearce, made in relation to the Children Act 1989: 
"The prime objective is, and always has been, the best interest of the child. The rest follows on 
because what could be better for the child than to have parents and other carers sharing parental 
responsibility and ordering their family affairs by agreement?".47 This image of the child as the 
victim of parents in conflict is, therefore, not confined to the divorce reform documents - it has 
also underpinned recent legislation, notably the Children Act 1989. As Roche argues, "Part of the 
agenda behind the Act was ... the idea of children as `victims' of their parents' divorce".48 
"Increasingly children were seen as the innocent victims of adult-relationship breakdown"49 and 
law's role was to be that of "lowering the stakes" in the parental battles, again to reduce inter-
parental conflict. To achieve that the Act created a new legal concept of parental responsibility,50 
giving a power to all married parents which is inalienable except via adoption proceedings and 
which has been `marketed' as facilitating the reduction of parental hostility and the 
encouragement of cooperative parenting.51  
 
The idea of the child as victim of parental conflict is also evident in judicial comments in relation 
to custody (residence) and access (contact) cases over the last two decades52 and, arguably, more 
so since the implementation of the Children Act 1989.53 Even though legislation has given 
parents the right to ask the court to order contact (when the care-giving parent is either denying 
any contact or contact in the form requested), courts have maintained a legal fiction - that contact 
is the right of the child - which feeds into the representation of the child as a victim if not in 
  
 
 9
contact with both parents.54  
 Access should be regarded as a basic right of the child ... no court should deprive a child 
of access unless it was wholly satisfied that it was in the interests of that child that access 
should cease.55  
  
 The starting point, always, is that every child has a right to be brought up in the 
knowledge of his non-custodial parent. That is a right which the courts are determined to 
preserve ... Their right to have their welfare served by re-establishing contact with their 
father at the earliest possible moment requires that the fullest attention should now be 
given [to that], with the best possible legal and medical help available ... .56  
 
What has occurred is that the relatively narrow popular and legal images of the child as victim 
have been reconstructed, but not to embrace victimisation by any adult or child committing 
against her any crime, including those offences relating to children and adults alike.  Rather, it 
has been extended to include victimisation from another form of parental `abuse'. To the 
`popular' image of the child as victim of physical or sexual abuse has been added the child as 
victim of inter-parental hostility and of emotional abuse. So powerful is this recent 
conceptualisation of the child as victim of parental separation and conflict that, as Jones and 
Parkinson have noted in relation to the child's contact with the `absent' parent, "there has been in 
the past a discernible reluctance of courts in England, Australia and elsewhere, to deny access 
entirely" even when the parent-child relationship had involved sexual abuse - that other great 
danger in available images of child victims.57   
 
MAKING PARENTS RESPONSIBLE 
 
Policy documents have conveyed the message that the existence of the potential danger of 
conflict induced trauma is proven by a large amount of recent research which suggests that 
divorce may produce children who are more likely to be unhappy, to underachieve and to 
become criminals than peers whose parents stay together or who live cooperatively after 
divorce.58 That message is also conveyed by `parent education' courses. These programmes, 
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developed in conjunction with courts and mediation services, have been running in parts of the 
USA for some years and there is now a rapid proliferation.59 They have been set up as a response 
to the belief that "uninformed parents are unwittingly using their children and the courts to `get 
back at' recalcitrant spouses"60 and aim to motivate parents to reduce their hostility towards each 
other and refrain from taking disputes to court.  "They ... provide an early intervention for parents 
who want to act in the best interests of their children but need education to do so".61 In the UK 
the Department of Health has produced a Parenting Initiative62 which includes funding for action 
projects, as a result of which two mediation services (Coventry and Sussex Family Mediation 
Services) have been grant-aided  to design and pilot an educational pack for parents attending 
mediation.63  
  
The assumption that there exists - unproblematically - a body of relevant knowledge is also made 
in the White Paper's use of the term `information' in regard to what is to be conveyed at the first 
port of call for all those intending to divorce.  "This will introduce parties to the benefits of 
marriage guidance and counselling, [and] provide information about the emotional, 
psychological, financial and legal aspects of separation and divorce and its effects on parents and 
children".64 The only noted concerns expressed in responses to the Lord Chancellor's Department 
on this issue are "that the provision of information should not overstep the boundary into advice 
giving", specifically legal advice giving, and, that "the form of information giving must be 
entirely objective".65 The response to neither concern allows of the possibility that the `facts' to 
be conveyed about the process and effects of child adjustment to parental separation are less than 
fully proven by `scientific' research and that the research, though voluminous, would not support 
so restricted an image of the child as victim, mainly or exclusively, of parental conflict as that 
which has become so authoritative in the 1990s. In 1983 Freeman had stated: `When compared 
with children who have suffered bereavement, it seems that children from homes who have 
suffered marital disruption encounter hardships considerably more frequently"66 but the possible 
range of `hardships' which could lead to the victimisation of the child were at that stage of the 
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debate not subsumed in `conflict reduction'. Research has since shown, for example that a major 
hardship in the lives of families  after divorce is poverty.67 Research has also revealed the extent 
of spousal abuse and the likelihood that a good proportion of divorcing mothers have suffered 
violence68 which their children have witnessed.69 In practice children may be victims of contact 
rather than lack of contact.70   
 
Furthermore the results of research focusing on the effects of parental conflict and separation 
may not be as conclusive and clear cut as statements in recent policy documents suggest.71 Policy 
in relation to divorce is being influenced by associations between divorce and, for example, 
educational attainment, criminal activity and employment which do not adequately address `third 
factor' hypotheses. As Burghes concludes on reviewing research evidence, `Because the children 
of intact marriages fare better on average than those who experience separation and divorce, does 
not mean that preventing the latter would create better outcomes associated with the former'.72 
The finding of the Exeter Family Study that `family re-ordering(s) had the strongest association 
with poor outcomes for children'73 had great public impact74 but must be set alongside research 
like that of Elliott and Richards who have shown that conditions often pre-exist the divorce.  In 
the latter study children whose parents divorced when they were aged 7-16 obtained worse 
scores for each of their four outcome measures than those whose parents remained married but 
`this was the case at age sixteen after the parental divorce but also at age seven before the 
parental divorce' [my italics].75  
 
This is not to imply that the research about the psychological harm children may suffer should 
not be taken seriously. However, there is a strong case that the proposed reforms are not a 
comprehensive response to such knowledge and will not, therefore, adequately address the 
interests of children.76 The selective reconstruction, within legal and political discourses, of 
results of research conducted within the `psy' and social sciences does not include the 
complexities found in the discussion of such research in scientific journals and does not 
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acknowledge the existence of other `information' about children of divorcing parents. Yet, 
because the major source of victimisation in legal and political communications is now taken to 
be that of inter-parental hostility, the sole response is an attempt to reduce parental hostility and 
promote joint parenting. It is, perhaps, stating the obvious that there are very clear political 
benefits to the existence of this particular image of the child. In relation to proposed divorce 
reform, the focus on the child as victim - and parental hostility as the cause of the child's 
suffering - allows for a policy of mediation rather than the use of solicitors because mediation is 
seen as a more effective way of reducing hostility and encouraging cooperation. It justifies a 
move from at the same time, a fault-based divorce law to a process over time and is thought to be 
a cheaper process than the current usage of lawyers and courts, thereby addressing the problem 
of the mounting Legal Aid bill. Without a clear image of the child as victim of parental conflict 
the divorce reforms proposed would be too difficult to `sell', challenging as they do professional, 
religious and political interests.77   
 
There are other economic and political benefits accruing from the current prevailing image of the 
child as victim of divorce.  Had that image not become so powerful, other images of the child as 
victim in these circumstances might have been more influential. Without a more widely available 
image of the child as victim of an abusing `absent' parent it is the `implacably hostile' mother 
who continues to be the bogey`man' of family law: hostility is deemed to have no justification 
even in the context of (fear of) violence.  Furthermore, a focus on the benefits for children of 
'stability' would require a range of social welfare policies to ensure greater stability of family life 
rather than `a time to reflect'.78 These policies have much more onerous financial implications 
and do not fit in with the principle of minimal state intervention. If images of children rooted in 
other `dangers' in the situation of parental separation had become more widely available and 
authoritative the corresponding response would have included much more than divorce 
mediation and, crucially, would not have placed such stress on the responsibility of parents.  
Information-giving programmes and mediation processes may have been designed to help 
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children and may result in an improvement in the lives of at least some children but the strategy 
is to reduce conflict by inducing parental guilt.  The Michigan and Kansas programmes of 
parental education with titles like SMILE (Start Making It Livable for Everyone),79 GRASP 
(General Responsibilities as Separating Parents) and Sensible Approach to Divorce80 point up 
the normative function of such courses, which not only reduce pressure on courts but also feed 
into and reinforce the current political ideology of the family.  
  
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN 
 
The image of the child, in relation to parental separation, as victim of hostile, non-cooperative 
and uncommunicative parents has thus become a semantic artefact of clear utility in the political 
as well as the legal discourse by enabling family policy to be based on a placing of responsibility 
for victimisation of the child at the door of one or both parents.81  The problem is of course that 
these prevailing images of children as victims - so useful to policy makers and professional 
practice - are unlikely to lead to a reformed divorce process and aftermath which are much 
`better' for the children involved. Not only is the nature of the victimisation constructed very 
narrowly but the image of the child as victim of divorce is kept quite distinct from other images 
of children, for example the child as victim of paternal abuse or victim of poverty (though the 
child as potential offender is used to strengthen the idea of the child as victim of divorce) and can 
only be sustained by particular images of parents. The focus on parental action to remove or 
reduce `victimisation' caused by parental conflict is sustained by an image of parents capable of 
cooperation and communication via `reflection' and `mediation'. In so far as this image is 
authoritative then those other available images, for example of parents incapable of joint 
parenting and as capable of using contact for abusing ex-partner or child, are not reconstructed 
for use within political and legal discourses.82  
 
The White Paper discourages the juxtaposition of different images by discussing separately the 
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issue of domestic violence in a chapter dealing with "Related Areas of Family Law and 
Procedure".83 The Consultation Paper had previously explained that one objective of the reforms 
"would be to separate the divorce process and matters relating to children, home and 
maintenance from other matters such as molestation and violence by removing the jurisdiction to 
grant injunctions for molestation and violence ancillary to divorce proceedings"84 because the 
process to divorce "is a separate matter".85 This constituting domestic violence as an issue not 
properly relevant to the divorce process allows the idea that parental cooperation is possible - a 
necessary precondition for the existence of `a continuing but separated'86 traditional family which 
is the ideological basis of current policy. This means that policy and practice are underpinned by 
fragmented, partial and compartmentalised images of children which can only disadvantage real 
children.  The welfare of children has been identified so closely with the reduction of conflict 
that mediation is equated with welfare. As James says, "The welfare principle is reflected in the 
implicit assumption that encouraging parental responsibility and decision-making, thereby 
reducing conflict, is the best way of ensuring that the child's welfare is met".87   
 
But there is another, perhaps even more important, corollary. As Thane pointed out in relation to 
late nineteenth and twentieth century legislation, "A succession of statutes ... have striven to 
protect children from neglect and ill-treatment by parents and guardians ... However at no time 
was it thought necessary to give children independent voices in such proceedings".88 This has 
been changing, particularly in relation to issues of compulsory care and medical decisions where 
children are being heard and, sometimes, those voices are determinative of outcome.89 
Nevertheless, the child of divorce is being portrayed almost exclusively as victim, a potential 
detriment as the `survivors' of child sexual abuse and domestic violence have made clear in their 
rejection of the label of victim.90 The label inhibits discussion as to whether, in relation to the 
divorce process, the child should have anything other than a passive role. Instead the image could 
be that of `legal actor' and legislation could recognise the autonomy rights of the child91 rather 
than her `right' to be protected92 but debate, now familiar in many areas of child-related law and 
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practice, about `balancing' liberationist and protectionist rights for children, has not yet taken 
place in relation to divorce law. The idea that separating parents protect their children and must 
be left free to do so has been largely unchallenged in recent debates. But, as Roche points out, 
the family and community can act to the disadvantage of children and the "recognition of the 
possibility of the child having interests which are independent of family and community leads us 
to a consideration of how such interests might be expressed and how the wider community 
should respond to such a voice".93 This consideration has been precluded in relation to divorce 
by the construction of only one `independent' image of the child - that of the child `battered' by 
parental conflict. The child rarely has needs voiced other than those relating to inter-parental 
conflict and rarely has a status other than that of victim. Roche therefore makes the timely point 
that "the issue now is one, not of establishing the principle of children's rights, but of extending 
the range of situations where the language is perceived as legitimate" (1995, p. 292).94  
 
This criticism that the child is being given no independent voice in the divorce process and that 
divorce reform proposals do not give sufficient priority to the welfare of the child has led to a 
response from within the mediation movement, a response already apparent in the USA where 
strategies for `empowering' children "to reduce children's victimisation and enable them to 
emerge as winners" are already being discussed and implemented.95 With such a crucial role for 
mediation in the reform proposals mediators have little option but to develop ways in which the 
welfare of the child, and indeed her rights, can be addressed in the process of mediation without 
undermining the fundamental premise of mediation that it allows parent control and 
determination of outcome.96 So National Family Mediation (NFM) in 1993-4 conducted a study 
of the views and practices amongst mediators in regard to the role of children in mediation. Their 
Report concluded:  
 In relation to arrangements for children, the perspective of those children is a crucial part 
of the information necessary for decision-making. This information can be introduced 
into the mediation in two ways: i. by parents themselves or ii. by direct consultation with 
children within the process. Whether children should be consulted directly, how or at 
what stage in the process are matters to be agreed jointly by the mediators and parties.97  
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Therefore NFM has devised new training schemes for mediators to help parents consult their 
children or mediators to `consult' children directly.98 Yet, as Richards points out, this innovation 
"cannot square a circle" as "there is no way in which they could use information that a child may 
give them without destroying their own neutral position".99   
 
The attempt to provide the child with an active role in a scheme developed with an image of the 
child as victim may be doomed to failure and it may be that the child as legal actor should not 
necessarily supplant the child as victim in this context.100 Furthermore, as Fox Harding points 
out, "a stress on children as independent actors may in fact be a smoke screen used to legitimate 
the withdrawal of the state from responsibility for the upbringing and maintenance of them".101 
Instead of such a polarised discussion two possibilities need further consideration. First that there 
may be understandings of children and their needs other than that of the child as victim of 
parental conflict and that these images may have quite different implications. Secondly, that the 
image of an abstract child may be so powerful that it inhibits or prevents discussion of the needs 
of the actual child, that is the child who becomes the focus of procedures.102 At the very least, 
therefore, Roche's comment that "Children are talked about. What needs to change is how they 
are talked about and how children can connect with and participate in such conversations"103 
should be relevant in relation to discussions of divorce reform.   
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
These discussions require a clearer theoretical perspective on what brings people to see children 
and families in particular ways: how and why our images of children are developed, and how, as 
a result, concern is expressed, by those operating within one or more social systems, about 
particular `harms' to children. As King has argued, 
 Taking, as we have done, the starting point of harm to children, it is then possible, using 
a closed system approach, to examine how each of these systems, which are treated by 
society as authoritative, understands and gives meaning to communications from other 
systems concerning `harm to children'.104  
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King is arguing on the basis of autopoietic theory but a similar message is given by Rex and 
Wendy Stainton Rogers in their book subtitled "Shifting Agendas of Child Concern"  which 
takes a polytextualist approach to the analysis of discourse relating to 'child concern'.   
 A critical polytextualist analysis of these discourses seeks to address them as socially 
constructed ... stories, and to pursue child concern within the recognition that it belongs 
to and cannot be separated from the social-tectonics of social thinking in general terms.  
It offers not an understanding of children concern per se so much as a concern about 
concern. ... we believe it is crucial to be able to highlight and discuss the child oppressive 
potentials of each, without being immediately accused either of merely attacking the 
well-meaningness of those who argue for them, or of failing to acknowledge the danger 
of our challenge.105   
 
As the authors point out in their concluding chapter, the alternative, "To embark on a crusading 
quest for villains", is an exercise which puts its operator "within a chimerical fairy-tale 
world in which, once the brave knight has slain the dragon, children can all live `happily 
ever after'".106  Applying knowledge about the effects of parental conflict on children in 
the abstract may slay the dragon of parental conflict and may improve the lives of some 
actual children but it will leave untouched and unnoticed other sources of harm. To quote 
King again, referring to past difficulties in `solving' the problems of child protection,   
The difficulty ... was that each system's vision of what constituted society, was restricted 
by its own selectivity ... Both together and separately their communicative codes 
produced within each system versions of modern society which reduced anything which 
did not have meaning for them to the status (or rather non-status) of `noise' [which] 
consisted of whatever could not be explained using the programmes available to the 
system, but, nevertheless, had to be acknowledged as existing.107  
 
A phenomenon `known' in one closed system is `unknowable' (noise) in another system108 with 
the result that policies are based on a simplified vision. They may also be based on a distorted 
vision. Currently, the image of the child of divorcing parents which is conveyed through legal 
and political communications relies on knowledge reconstructed from systems external to law 
and politics. This gives the impression that there is a consensus across systems of law, politics, 
  
 
  
economics and the social and medical sciences but this masks differences in meaning and 
authority. In terms of autopoietic theory, what is occurring is `interference'. Teubner defines this 
as the phenomena that occurs when "communications that apparently bridge both [or several] 
discourses are in reality separate pieces of information ... coupled only by their synchronization 
and coevolution"109 so that what results is `confusion' arising from different ways of thinking 
about children in different discursive systems. What is missing is acknowledgement of how and 
why separate systems construct and reconstruct truths embodying particular understandings of 
what is `good' and `bad' for children. If this type of analysis is taken on board then it becomes at 
least possible to make visible a much wider range of images of children and to locate those 
systems, as well as their inter-relatedness and their limits, where such images can be responded 
to in ways that are most likely to meet the complex and varied needs of children.110  
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